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The 2008-2009 crisis was characterized by an unprecedented degree of international 
synchronization as all major industrialized countries experienced large macroeconomic 
contractions.  Countries  also  experienced  large  and  synchronized  contractions  in  the 
growth of financial flows. In this paper we present a two-country model with financial 
markets frictions where credit-driven recessions can explain these features of the recent 
crisis.  A  credit  contraction  can  emerge  as  a  self-fulfilling  equilibrium  caused  by 
pessimistic but fully rational expectations. As a result of the credit contraction, in a 
financially integrated world, countries experience large and, endogenously synchronized, 
declines in asset prices and economic activity (international recessions). 
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1    Introduction   
During the 2007/2009 crisis all major industrialized countries experienced extraordinarily synchronized 
and extraordinarily large contractions in real and financial aggregates. The main objective of this paper is 
to provide an explanation for these two features of the crisis: its international dimension (both real and 
financial), and its depth. Our hypothesis is that multiple self-fullling equilibria in credit markets can explain these
features. We will make our point developing a stylized two-country incomplete-markets model
where credit is used by rms both to pay dividends to owners and to nance hiring. For this
reason credit markets are linked to labor markets and therefore disturbances in credit markets
(i.e. tighter credit constraints) have adverse repercussions in the labor markets. We then
go on to present our main theoretical contribution, that is to show that tighter/looser credit
constraints can emerge endogenously as dierent self-fulling equilibria: in \bad" equilibria
rms are nancially constrained and economic activity, intermediation and asset prices are
depressed; in \good" equilibria rms are un-constrained and economic activity, intermediation
and asset prices are high. In a closed economy there is little dierence between endogenous
and exogenous credit shocks but in two nancially integrated economies the two constructs
have very dierent implications. Exogenous credit shocks imply strong co-movement of real
activity but not necessarily co-movement of intermediation; endogenous shocks on the other
hand always imply a strong co-movement of both real activity and intermediation. Since
we document that empirically during the 2007-2009 crisis there has been strong co-movement
along both dimensions, the theory of credit shocks emerging endogenously as dierent equilibria
seems better suited to explain recent events. In other words we propose a theory of endogenous
correlation of credit shocks which seems well suited to explain many features of "international
recessions" like the one of 2007-2009. Modeling the shocks as an endogenous process has also
important policy implications as it suggests that changes in structural features of the economy,
such us nancial integration or the public provision of liquidity, can change the volatility and
the correlation of shocks (usually taken as exogenous variables) and hence the vulnerability of
economies to credit shocks.
Our second contribution relates to the depth of the crisis. We argue that an "ordinary"
credit shock can indeed generate a "extra-ordinary" recession like the current crisis. In order to
show that this is the case we study a version of our model with occasionally binding constraints
and show that there exist an equilibrium path in which credit constraints are not binding for a
long time and, as a result, both economies undergo a long lasting expansion both in economic
activity (gradual) and credit (rapid); if constraints become binding after this long expansionary
phase, rms are forced to under-go a large de-leveraging which reduces the amount of credit
they have available for hiring and thus causes a sharp recession, even if the possibility of the
constraints becoming binding is fully anticipated by rms and households. We argue that
this asymmetry between the expansion phase (with fast growing credit growth and mild real
2growth) and the recession (with sharp collapse in both economic activity and credit) captures
well the macroeconomic developments of advanced economies during the recent cycle.
One important observation concerning the international dimension of the recent crisis is
that although real GDP decline about the same amount in US and in the rest of the G7 coun-
tries, employment was hit particularly hard in the US but not in the remaining G7 countries
(see Ohanian, 2010). As a consequence labor productivity soared in US but declined in the rest
of the G7. Our baseline model with integrated credit markets and symmetric labor markets
cannot explain this cross country dierence. In the nal part of the paper we argue that is
not necessarily a problem of credit shocks but rather of how we model labor markets. We
do so by introducing a very stylized asymmetry in labor markets (more 
exibility in US and
less 
exiblity in the G6) in our baseline set-up: in this case credit shocks have the potential
to explain both the symmetric behavior of GDP and the asymmetric behavior of employment
(and labor productivity).
Our paper is related to the vast literature (both empirical and theoretical) studying the
sources of macroeconomic co-movement and international transmission of shocks. Usually co-
movement is explained as the result of synchronized disturbances (global or common shocks,
see for example Crucini, Kose and Otrok, 2011) and/or as the result of country-specic shocks
that spill to other countries (international transmission of country specic shocks). In this
paper we show that credit shocks generate co-movement for both reasons: exogenous credit
shocks spill-over from one country to the other, and endogenous credit shocks will appear to
the econometrician like a common-shock or a global factor. This nding is consistent with
the empirical results of Helbling, Huidrom, Kose & Otrok (2010) according to which credit
market shocks matter in explaining global business cycles, especially during the 2009 global
recession. Recent contributions that analyze directly the strong international co-movement
during the 2007-2009 crisis include Dedola & Lombardo (2010), Devereux & Yetman (2010) and
Enders, Kollmann & Muller (2010). All these studies focus on the international transmission
of shocks in models with nancial market frictions and they do not consider the possibility of
an endogenously generated common credit shock.
The role of credit shocks and in particular of tightening credit constraints for macroeco-
nomic 
uctuations has recently, not surprisingly, been extensively studied (See, for example
Gertler and Kiyotaki 2009, Jermann and Quadrini 2009, Goldberg 2010, Khan and Thomas
2010, Lorenzoni and Guerrieri, 2010) but in a closed economy. Furthermore, while in those
contexts credit shocks are purely exogenous, in our paper we provide a micro foundation for
3these shocks which is based on self-fulling expectations. In this respect there are some simi-
larities with the multiple equilibria property of the model studied in Kocherlakota (2009) and
with the idea of a liquidity crisis as a multiple equilibrium discussed in Lucas and Stokey
(2011). In our model the multiplicity of equilibria derive from `occasionally binding' enforce-
ment constraints. This is another important dierence between our paper and other studies
that investigate the macroeconomic impact of nancial shocks (for example, Christiano, Motto
and Rostagno (2009) and Jermann and Quadrini 2009). Most of these contributions limit
the analysis to equilibria with always binding constraints and the quantitative properties are
studied using linear approximation techniques. In our model, instead, borrowing constraints
are only occasionally binding and this is important to generate the asymmetry between long
and gradual credit driven booms and sharp credit driven contractions. Mendoza (2010) also
studies an economy with occasionally binding constraints but does not investigate the impor-
tance of nancial shocks. Furthermore, by focusing on a small open economy, this study does
not address the issue of international co-movement which is one of the central issues studied
in our paper. Occasionally binding constraints are also central to Brunnermeier and Sannikov
(2010) but the analysis is limited to productivity shocks in a closed economy.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses macroeconomic evidence regarding
the recent crisis. We then present our theoretical framework in steps. First, to develop intu-
ition, section 3 presents the model with xed capital and with exogenous credit shocks. Section
4 makes credit shocks endogenous and section 5 introduces capital accumulation with occa-
sionally binding constraints. Section 6 presents the results of the model and section 7 shows
the eect of modifying the assumption of symmetric labor markets. Section 8 concludes.
2 Macroeconomic evidence
In this section we rst present some facts about international co-movement in dierent variables
during the 2007-2009 crisis Figure 1 plots the GDP dynamics for the G7 countries in six of
the most recent US recessionary episodes. In each panel we plot percent deviations for GDP
of each country from GDP in the quarter preceding the start of the US recession (as dated by
the NBER). Comparison of the bottom right panel of the gure with the other panels suggests
how the 2007-2009 recession stands out both in terms of depth and in terms of macroeconomic
synchronization among all G7 countries.
To make this point in a more general fashion in gure 2 we plot the average (with 2 standard
4Figure 1: The dynamics of GDP during the six most recent recessions in the G7 countries.
deviations bands) of 10 years rolling windows pairwise correlations of quarterly GDP growth
between all G7 countries. The dates in the graph correspond to the end points of the window
used to compute the correlation. The gure shows that in 2007 the average correlation jumps
from 0.3 to 0.7 and at the same time the sample standard deviation of the correlations falls
from 0.19 to 0.09, conrming that the 2007-2009 stands out in the post-war as a period of
extraordinarily high co-movement for all developed countries. For a similar point see also Imbs
(2010).
The high degree of international co-movement between US and other major countries is
also observed in other real and nancial variables. In gure 3 we analyze the pattern of GDP,
consumption, investment and employment in the period 2005-2010 for the US and an aggregate
of the other countries in the G7 group (from now on G6). The pictures highlights how GDP
consumption and investment are hit almost equally hard in US and in the G6. For employment,
as noted for example by Ohanian, 2010, the picture is dierent. In US employment declines
about 6% which is more than the 4% decline in GDP. This implies that in US labor productivity
during this recession is counter-cyclical. On the contrary in the G6 employment falls but much
























Figure 2: Rolling correlations of quarterly GDP growth among G7 countries.
productivity are dimensions in which the current crisis is "less" international. Later in the
theory section we'll consider a potential explanation for this asymmetry.
In gure 4 we look at nancial variables, in particular stock prices1 and the stock of net
debt of non nancial businesses.2
The stock market panel documents well the massive (one order of magnitude larger than
the decline in GDP) and extraordinarily synchronous (correlation of stock price growth during
the crisis approaches 1) decline in stock prices that took place during the crisis. The right
panel shows that also corporate debt, albeit with a delay, declined substantially both in the
US and in the rest of the G6 during the crisis: this evidence will be particularly important as
it will allow us to identify more precisely the source of credit disturbances. A nal observation
1The stock prices in US are the MSCI BARRA US stock market index, while stock prices in the G6 are
computed using the MSCI BARRA EAFE+Canada index which is an average of stock prices in advanced
economies except the US.
2For the US data is from the Flows of Funds Accounts and for the whole nonnancial business sector. For
the other countries it only includes the corporate non-nancial sector. Net Debt is dened as credit markets
instruments minus liquid assets i.e. the sum of foreign deposits, checkable deposits and currency, time and
savings deposits, money market funds, securities RPs, commercial paper, treasury securities, agency and GSE
backed securities, municipal securities and mutual fund shares. For other countries data is for nonnancial
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Note: Data for GDP, private consumtion, gross fixed capital formation are from OECD Quarterly National Accounts in PPP constant dollars.
Data for employment are from OECD Main Economic Indicators. All series are normalized to 1 in the fourth quarterof 2007.
Figure 3: GDP, Consumption, Investment and Employment in US and G6: 2005-2010
regards an asymmetry between the credit expansion period before the crisis and the credit
collapse period after the crisis. In the years before the crisis although debt experiences a very
rapid growth the other variables display standard or sub-standard growth. In the crisis periods
debt contracts but all real variables contracts very strongly. This feature is not unique of the
2007-2009 recessions and other authors that analyze empirically historical episodes of credit
booms have noticed that these booms are not necessarily associated with rapid real growth,
but when they collapse they are often associated with sharp real contractions.3
The facts presented here, in particular the high international correlation in real and nancial
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Figure 4: GDP, Stock market and corporate debt in US and G6: 2005-2010
variables, the counter-cyclical (US) productivity, the high employment and stock markets
volatility and the asymmetry between expansion and recessions are hard to explain with a
standard work-horse international model so in the next section start developing a framework
with credit disturbances that we believe is useful to understand the evidence presented in this
section and eventually the causes of such a large and internationally diused crisis.
83 The model with xed capital and exogenous credit shocks
We start with a simple model without capital accumulation and with exogenous credit shocks.
This allows us to provide the intuitions for some of the key results of the paper analytically.
After the presentation of the simple model it will be easy to extend it with capital accumulation.
There are two types of atomistic agents, investors and workers. A key dierence between
these two types of agents is the availability of dierent investment opportunities. Due to the
assumption of markets segmentation only investors have access to the ownership of rms while
workers can only save in the form of bonds. Investors discount the future at rate  while the
discount factor of workers is  > . The dierent discounting between the owners of rms
(investors) and workers implies that rms borrow from workers subject to the enforcement
constraints as we will describe below.
To facilitate the presentation we rst describe the closed-economy version of the model.
Once we have characterized the autarkic equilibrium, it will be easy to extend it to the envi-
ronment with international mobility of capital.
3.1 Investors and rms
Investors have lifetime utility E0
P1
t=0 tu(ct). They are the owners of rms and derive income
only from dividends. Denoting by dt the dividends paid by rms, the eective discount factor
for investors is mt+1 = uc(dt+1)=uc(dt). This is also the discount factor used by rms since
they maximize shareholders' wealth. As we will see, 
uctuations in the eective discount rate
play a central role in the analysis of this paper.
Firms operate the production function F(ht) =  kh
t, where  k is a xed input of capital and
ht is the variable input of labor. The parameter  is smaller than 1 implying decreasing returns
to scale in the variable input. In this version of the model without capital accumulation we
can think of  k as a normalizing constant.
Firms start the period with intertemporal debt bt. Before producing they choose the labor
input ht, the dividends dt, and the next period debt bt+1. The budget constraint is




where Rt is the gross interest rate.
The payments of wages, wtht, dividends, dt, and current debt net of the new issue, bt  
bt+1=Rt, are made before the realization of revenues. This implies that the rm faces a cash
9
ow mismatch during the period. The cash needed at the beginning of the period is wtht +
dt + bt   bt+1=Rt. To cover the cash 
ow mismatch, the rm contracts the intra-period loan
lt = wtht + dt + bt   bt+1=Rt which is repaid at the end of the period, after the realization of
revenues. From the budget constraint we can also see that the intra-period loan is equal to
the revenue F(ht).
Debt contracts are not perfectly enforceable as the rm can default. Default takes place at
the end of the period before repaying the intra-period loan. At this stage the rm holds the
revenues F(ht) which are equal to the intra-period loan lt. These are liquid funds that can be
easily diverted in the event of default. Default gives the lender the right to liquidate the rm's
assets. But after the diversion of lt = F(ht), the only remaining asset is the physical capital  k.
Suppose that the liquidation value of capital is t k, where t is stochastic. Since default arises
at the end of the period, the total liabilities of the rm are lt + bt+1=Rt. To ensure that the
rm does not default, the total liabilities are subject to the enforcement constraint4




Fluctuations in t aect the ability to borrow and, as we will see, they generate pro-cyclical
movements in real and nancial variables.5 Our goal is to derive the variable t endogenously
from liquidity considerations. As we will describe below, 
uctuations in this variable are
induced by self-fullling expectations leading to multiple equilibria. For the moment, however,
we treat t as an exogenous stochastic variable. Once we have characterized the equilibrium
with an exogenous t, we will make t endogenous.
To illustrate the role played by 
uctuations in t, consider a pre-shock equilibrium in which
the enforcement constraint is binding. Starting from this equilibrium, suppose that t decreases.
In response to the decline in t the rm is forced to reduce either the dividends and/or the
input of labor. To see this, let's start with the case in which the rm is unwilling to change
the input of labor. This implies that the intra-period loan lt = F(ht) also does not change.
Thus, the only way to satisfy the enforcement constraint is by reducing the intertemporal debt
bt+1. We can then see from the budget constraint, wtht + dt + bt = bt+1=Rt + F(ht), that the
reduction in bt+1 requires a reduction in dividends. Thus, the rm is forced to substitute debt
4Here we adopt a similar approach as in Hart and Moore (1994). After defaulting the rm bargains the
repayment with the lender. Under the assumption that the rm has all the bargaining power, the lender would
recover only the threat value t k. In anticipation of this, the lender will never lend more than t k.
5Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006) provide some evidence that the liquidity of capital t must be procyclical to
match the amount of capital reallocation observed in the data.
10with equities.
Alternatively the rm could keep the dividend payments unchanged and reduce the intra-
period loan lt = F(ht). This would also ensure that the enforcement constraint is satised but
it requires the reduction in the input of labor. Therefore, after a reduction in t, the rm faces
a trade-o: paying lower dividends or cutting employment. The optimal choice depends on the
relative cost of changing these two margins which, as we will see, depends on the stochastic
discount factor for investors mt+1 = uc(dt+1)=uc(dt).
Firm's problem: The optimization problem of the rm can be written recursively as
V (s;b) = max
d;h;b0
(












where s are the aggregate states, including the shock , and the prime denotes the next period
variable. The enforcement constraint takes into account that the intra-period loan is equal to
the rm's output, that is, lt = wtht + dt + bt   bt+1=Rt = F(ht).





REm0 = 1   ; (5)
where  is the Lagrange multiplier for the enforcement constraint. These conditions are derived
under the assumption that dividends are always positive, which will be the case if the investors'
utility satises uc(0) = 1. The detailed derivation is in Appendix A.
We can see from condition (4) that there is a wedge in the demand for labor if the enforce-
ment constraint is binding ( > 0). This derives from the fact that the input of labor needs
11to be nanced and part of the nancing has to come from equity (through lower payment
of dividends). As long as the cost of equity (1=Em0) is greater than the cost of debt (R),
expanding the input of labor is costly in the margin because the rm needs to substitute debt
with equity. It is then the equity premium 1=Em0  R that determines the labor wedge as can
be seen from condition (5).6 The wedge is strictly increasing in  and disappears when  = 0,
that is, when the enforcement constraint is not binding.
Some partial equilibrium properties: The characterization of the rm's problem in par-
tial equilibrium provides helpful insights about the property of the model once extended to a
general equilibrium set-up. For partial equilibrium we mean the allocation achieved when the
interest rate and the wage rate are both exogenously given and constant.
Under these conditions, equation (5) shows that  decreases with the expected discount
factor Em0. A decrease in  makes the enforcement constraint tighter. Because rms reduce
the payment of dividends, the investors's consumption has to decrease. This induces a decline
in the discount factor m0 = uc(d0)=uc(d) and an increase in the multiplier  (condition (5)).
Condition (4) then shows that the demand for labor declines.
Intuitively, when the credit conditions become tighter, rms need to rely more on equity
nancing and less on debt. This requires investors to cut consumption (dividends) which is
costly since they have concave utility. Because of this, in the short-term rms do not raise
enough equity needed to keep the pre-shock production scale and cut employment. If investors'
utility were linear (risk-neutrality), the discount factor would be equal to Em0 =  and the
credit shock would not aect employment. This also requires that the interest rate does not
change, which is the case in the partial equilibrium considered here. In the general equilibrium,
of course, prices do change. In particular, movements in the demand of credit and labor aect
the interest rate R and the wage rate w. To derive the aggregate eects we need to close the
model and characterize the general equilibrium.
3.2 Closing the model and general equilibrium
There is a representative household/worker with lifetime utility E0
P1
t=0 tU(ct;ht), where ct
is consumption, ht is labor and  is the intertemporal discount factor. It will be convenient to
6Notice that we are using the term `equity premium' to denote the dierential between the expected share-
holders' return and the interest rate on bonds. Since shareholders and bondholders are dierent agents, the
equity premium is not only determined by the cost of risk (risk premium).
12assume that the period-utility takes the form








The worker's budget constraint is




and the rst order conditions for labor, ht, and next period bonds, bt+1, are







We can now dene a competitive general equilibrium. The aggregate states, denoted by s,
are given by the credit conditions  and the aggregate stock of bonds B.
Denition 3.1 (Recursive equilibrium) A recursive competitive equilibrium is dened by a
set of functions for (i) workers' policies hw(s), cw(s), bw(s); (ii) rms' policies h(s;b), d(s;b),
b(s;b); (iii) rms' value V (s;b); (iv) aggregate prices w(s), R(s), m(s0); (v) law of motion
for the aggregate states s0 = 	(s). Such that: (i) household's policies satisfy the optimality
conditions (6)-(7); (ii) rms' policies are optimal and V (s;b) satises the Bellman's equation
(1); (iii) the wage and interest rates are the clearing prices in the markets for labor and bonds,
and the discount factor for rms is m(s0) = uc(dt+1)=uc(dt); (iv) the law of motion 	(s) is
consistent with the aggregation of individual decisions and the stochastic processes for z and .
To illustrate the main properties of the model we look at some special cases. Consider
rst the economy without uncertainty, that is,  is constant. In this economy the enforcement
constraint binds in a steady state equilibrium. To see this, consider the rst order condition
for the bond, equation (7), which in a steady state becomes R = 1. Using this condition
to eliminate R in (5) and taking into account that in a steady state Em0 = , we get  =
1   = > 0 (since  > ). Firms want to borrow as much as possible because the cost of
borrowing|the interest rate|is smaller than their discount rate.
With uncertainty, however, the enforcement constraint may be binding only occasionally.
13In particular, after a large and unexpected decline in . In this case rms will be forced to
cut dividends inducing a change in the discount factor Em0. Furthermore, the change in the
demand for credit impacts on the equilibrium interest rate. Using condition (5) we can see
that these changes aect the multiplier , which in turn impacts on the demand for labor
(see equation (4)). On the other hand, an increase in  may leave the enforcement constraint
non-binding without direct eects on the demand of labor. Therefore, the responses to credit
shocks could be highly asymmetric: negative shocks induce large falls in employment and
output while the impacts of positive shocks is moderate.
3.3 Capital mobility
Let's consider now two countries, domestic and foreign, with the same size, preferences and
technology as described in the previous section. Although we consider the case with only
two symmetric countries, the model can be easily extended to any number of countries and
with dierent degrees of heterogeneity. For the moment we continue to assume that t is an
exogenous stochastic variable, specic to each country.
Once we allow for cross-country capital mobility, we have to specify what agents can do
in an integrated nancial market. We continue to assume that there is market segmentation
in the ownership of rms, that is, workers are unable to purchase shares of rms. However,
in addition to domestic bonds they can purchase foreign nancial assets as specied below.
Furthermore, investors are now able to purchase shares of foreign rms.
Investors/rms: Because rms are subject to country specic shocks, investors would gain
from diversifying the cross-country ownership of shares. Therefore, in an economy that is
nancially integrated, investors choose to own the worldwide portfolio of shares and we have
a representative `worldwide' investor.7 Because domestic and foreign rms are owned by the
same representative shareholder, they will use the same discount factor mt+1 = uc(dt+1 +
d
t+1)=uc(dt+d
t), where investors' consumption is the sum of dividends paid by domestic rms,
dt, plus the dividends paid by foreign rms, d
t. From now on we will use the star superscript
to denote variables pertaining to the foreign country.
Besides the common discount factor, rms continue to solve problem (1) and the rst order
conditions are given by equations (4) and (5). Let's focus on condition (5), which we rewrite
7A perfect diversication of portfolios is optimal because investors' utility depends only on consumption. If
investors derived utility also from leisure, a perfect diversication would not be necessarily optimal.
14here for both countries,
RtEmt+1 = 1   t;
R
tEm
t+1 = 1   
t:
Since the discount factor is common to domestic and foreign rms, that is, Emt+1 = Em
t+1,
and the interest rate is equalized across countries, Rt = R
t, the above conditions imply that
the lagrange multiplier will also be equalized, that is, t = 
t. Therefore, independently of
which country is hit by a shock, if the enforcement constraint is binding for domestic rms,
it will also be binding for foreign rms. This also implies that the labor wedges are equalized
across countries. In fact, condition (4) is still the optimality condition for the choice of labor
















This property is crucial for understanding the cross-country impact of a nancial shock as we
will describe below. Later we will also consider an extension of the model where the labor
wedge may respond dierently in the two countries.
Households/workers: Although workers are still prevented from accessing the market for
the ownership of rms, with capital mobility they can engage in international nancial trans-
actions with foreign workers. In addition to holding bonds issued by domestic rms, domestic
workers can buy state-contingent claims from foreign workers. We still assume that rms
borrow from domestic workers but they cannot sign state contingent contracts with workers.
The assumption that rms borrow only from domestic workers is without loss of generality:
whether they borrow domestically or in the foreign market is irrelevant in an integrated capital
market. The unavailability of state-contingent claims between rms and workers is essential
to retain market incompleteness.
Denote by nt+1(st+1) the units of consumption goods received at time t + 1 by domestic
workers if the aggregate states are st+1. These are worldwide states, and therefore, they include
the aggregates states of both countries as will be made precise below. Of course, in equilibrium,
the consumption units received by workers in the domestic country must be equal to the
15consumption units paid by workers in the foreign country, that is, nt+1(st+1)+n
t+1(st+1) = 0.
This must be satised for all possible realizations of the aggregate states st+1.
The budget constraint of a worker in the domestic country is







where qt(st+1)=Rt is the unit price of the contingent claims.
Given the specication of the utility function, the rst order conditions for the choice of
















p(st+1) = q(st+1); for all st+1; (10)
where p(st+1) is the probability (or probability density) of the aggregate states in the next
period for the world economy.
Since in equilibrium the prices and probabilities of the contingencies are the same for









Therefore, the ratio of consumption of domestic and foreign workers remains constant over time.
This is a well known property of environments with a full set of state-contingent claims. In our
environment the constancy of the consumption ratio is among workers (and among investors)
but not between workers and investors because of the assumption of market segmentation.
Before continuing we would like to clarify that the assumption of contingent claims among
workers is not essential for the results of the paper. We could simply assume that workers can
engage in international non-contingent lending and borrowing only. Or equivalently, that rms
can engage in international borrowing. However, the availability of contingent claims greatly
simplies the characterization of the equilibrium because it allows us to reduce the number of
`sucient' state variables. This property will be convenient once we extend the model with
16capital accumulation.
Aggregate states and equilibrium: We can now dene the equilibrium for the open-
economy version of the economy. The aggregate states s are given by the variables  and ,
the nancial liabilities of rms, Bt and B
t , and the net foreign asset position of the domestic
country, Nt. Since in equilibrium the net foreign asset position of the domestic country is the
negative of the foreign position, once we know Bt, B
t and Nt we also know the total wealth of
domestic workers, Bt + Nt, and foreign workers, B
t   Nt. Therefore, st = (;;Bt;B
t ;Nt).
Denition 3.2 (Recursive equilibrium) A recursive competitive equilibrium is dened by a





w(s;s0); (ii) rms' policies h(s;b), d(s;b), b(s;b), h(s;b), d(s;b), b(s;b); (iii) rms' values
V (s;b) and V (s;b); (iv) aggregate prices w(s), w(s), R(s), m(s;s0), q(s;s0); (v) law of motion
for the aggregate states s0 = 	(s). Such that: (i) household's policies satisfy the optimality
conditions (6)-(10); (ii) rms' policies are optimal and satisfy the Bellman's equation (1)
for both countries; (iii) the wages clear the labor markets; the interest rates and the price
for contingent claims clear the worldwide nancial markets; the discount rate used by rms
satises m(s;s0) = uc(dt+1 +d
t+1)=uc(dt +d
t); (iv) the law of motion 	(s) is consistent with
the aggregation of individual decisions and the stochastic process for  and .
The only dierence with respect to the equilibrium in the closed economy is that there
is the additional market for foreign claims and the discount factor for rms is given by the
worldwide representative investor. The market clearing condition for the foreign claims is
N(s0) + N(s0) = 0. This is in addition to the clearing conditions for the domestic bond
markets (lending to rms).
Although the general denition of the recursive equilibrium is based on the set of state
variables st = (t;
t;Bt;B
t ;Nt), we can use some of the properties derived above and char-
acterize the equilibrium with a smaller set of states. Let Wt = Bt + B
t be the worldwide
wealth of households/workers. This is the sum of bonds issued by domestic rms, Bt, and
foreign rms, B
t . Then using the fact that the consumption ratio of domestic and foreign
workers is constant at  and the employment policy of rms does not depend on the individual
debt, the recursive equilibrium can be characterized using the state variables st = (t;
t;Wt).
Essentially, the assumption of cross-country risk-sharing among workers and investors (but not
between workers and investors) allows us to reduce the number of `endogenous' states to only
17one variable.
Intuitively, by knowing Wt, we know the worldwide liability of rms, but not the distribu-
tion between domestic and foreign rms. However, to characterize the rms' policies, we only
need to know the worldwide debt, which is equal to Wt. Since investors own an internationally
diversied portfolio of shares, eectively there is only one representative global investor. It is
as if there is a representative rm with two productive units: one unit located in the domestic
country and the other in the foreign country. Since both units have a common owner, it does
not matter how the debt is distributed between the two units. What matters from the per-
spective of the investor is the total debt and the total payment of dividends. This has some
similarity with the problem solved by a multinational rms that faces demand uncertainty in
dierent countries as studied in Goldberg and Kolstad (1995). There is also some similarity
with the problem faced by multinational banks that own subsidiaries in dierent countries. Ce-
torelli and Goldberg (2010) provide evidence that multinational banks do reallocate nancial
resources internally in response to country specic shocks.
Total workers' wealth is also a sucient statistic for the characterization of the workers'
policies since the consumption ratio between domestic and foreign households remains constant
at . This property limits the computational complexity of the model, making feasible the use
of non-linear approximation methods. We will come back to this point after the description of
the general model with capital accumulation.
We are not ready to state the following proposition about the impact of a nancial shock.
Proposition 3.1 An unexpected change in t (domestic credit shock) has the same impact on
employment and output of domestic and foreign countries.
Proof 3.1 We have already shown that the Lagrange multiplier t is common for domestic
and foreign rms. If the wage ratio in the two countries does not change, the rst order
conditions imply that all rms choose the same employment. To complete the proof we have
to show that the cross-country wage ratio stays constant. Because rms in both countries have
the same demand for labor and the ratio of workers' consumption remains constant, the rst
order condition for the supply of labor from workers implies that the wage ratio between the
two countries does not change.
Therefore, independently of whether a credit shock hits the domestic or foreign markets,
both countries experience the same macroeconomic consequences. Notice though that although
18exogenous credit shocks can explain co-movement in GDP and other real variables there are two
problems with this approach. The rst, and more general, is that treating shocks as exogenous
limits our ability to understand their source and possible policy intervention to mitigate their
adverse eects. The second, and more specic, is that although a country-specic exogenous
shock can generate macroeconomic co-movement, it will also induce nancial 
ows tend to move
in opposite directions. To show this, consider an initial equilibrium in which the enforcement
constraints are not binding in either countries. Starting from this equilibrium suppose that the
domestic economy is hit by a credit contraction (reduction in t) inducing binding enforcement
constraints in both countries. Since t is lower only in the domestic country, the outstanding
debt of domestic rms contracts but the debt of foreign rms actually increases. Actually
the foreign rm increase their debt so they can pay more dividends to their shareholder, now
that the domestic rm is constrained. Therefore, the model with `exogenous' credit shocks
generates negative cross-country co-movement in debt.
This feature of the model is inconsistent with the data in the right panel of 4 showing a
high degree of cross-country co-movement also in the 
ows of nancing. However, as we will
see in the next section, once we make 
uctuations in t and 
t endogenous, the model also
generates a high degree of co-movement in nancial 
ows, introducing a second source of real
macroeconomic synchronization.
4 Endogenous credit shocks
After illustrating how a credit shock propagates to the real sector of the economy, we now
provide a micro foundation for endogenous 
uctuations in t. We proceed rst with the closed-
economy model and then we extend it to a two-country set-up.
Financial autarky: Suppose that in case of liquidation, physical capital  k can be sold
either to households or rms. In the rst case one unit of capital is transformed in  units of
consumption. Alternatively, the capital can be sold to other rms for productive uses. In this
case one unit of capital can be transformed in  units of reinstalled capital. The reallocation in
other rms is more ecient than its transformation in consumption goods, that is,  <   1.
However, in order for non-defaulting rms to buy additional capital, they need liquid funds. In
this sense our model shares some features of the model studied in Kiyotaki and Moore (2008).





a non-defaulting rm can buy additional capital only if the rm has previously chosen not to
borrow up to the limit, that is, constraint (12) is not binding. Therefore, if at the beginning
of the period rms choose not to borrow up to the limit, ex-post there will be rms that are
capable of purchasing the capital of a defaulting rm. In this case the market price of the
liquidated capital is . On the other hand, if at the beginning of the period all rms choose
to borrow up to the limit, ex-post there will not be rms with liquidity. Then the capital of a
defaulting rm can only be sold to households and the market price is .
Since the value of liquidated capital depends on the nancial choices of rms, which in turn
depends on the expected liquidation value, the model could generate multiple (self-fullling)
equilibria.
Suppose that the expected liquidation price is t = . The low price makes the enforcement
constraint (12) tighter, which may induce rms to borrow up to the limit in order to contain
the cut in dividends and/or employment. Then, if all rms borrow up to the limit, ex-post
there will not be any rm that has liquidity to purchase the capital of a defaulting rm. Thus,
the ex-post liquidation price is , fullling the market expectation.
Now suppose that the expected liquidation price is . Because the enforcement constraint
(12) is not tight in the current period but could become tighter in the future, rms may choose
not to borrow up to the limit. But then, in case of liquidation, there will be rms capable of
purchasing the liquidated capital and the market price is . So also in this case we have that
the expectation of a high liquidation value is fullled by the rms' borrowing choice.
Whether multiple equilibria could arise depends on the particular states of the economy.
Three cases are possible:
1. The liquidation price is  with probability 1. This arises if we are in a state in which
rms choose to borrow up to the limit independently of the expectation over t.
2. The liquidation price is  with probability 1. This arises if we are in a state in which
rms do not borrow up to the limit independently of the expectation over t.
3. The liquidation price is  with some probability p 2 (0;1). This arises if we are in a state
in which rms choose to borrow up to the limit when the expectation for the liquidation
20value is t =  but they do not borrow up to the limit when the expectation for the
liquidation price is t = .
The third case is the most interesting because it generates multiple sunspot equilibria, and
therefore, potential 
uctuations in t. In this case the low liquidation price  could arise with
any probability p. In general we can denote by pt(st) the probability of t = . Besides the
fact that the probability distribution of t could be time variant, the properties of the model
characterized in previous sections do not change.
Financial integration: As in the closed economy, dierent values of t are associated to self-
fulling expectations. Although each country could have dierent liquidation values of capital,
we want to show that t cannot be dierent from 
t once the two countries become nancially
integrated.
As we have seen in the previous section, if the enforcement constraint is binding in one
country, it must also be binding in the other country, that is, t = 
t > 0. This eliminates
equilibria where t =  and 
t = . We state this property formally in the next proposition.
Proposition 4.1 In equilibria with integrated nancial markets, t is always equal to 
t
Proof 4.1 Suppose that the equilibrium is characterized by t =  and 
t = . In order to have
t =  we need that t > 0 and to have 
t =  we need that 
t = 0. But in an equilibrium with
integrated nancial markets t is always equal to 
t. Therefore, this cannot be an equilibrium.
Using the same argument we can exclude the possibility of an equilibrium with t =  and

t = . Thus, the only possible equilibria are characterized by t = 
t.
Therefore, nancial integration implies perfect cross-country co-movement in t, which
introduces a second channel of real macroeconomic synchronization: not only a change in one
country  aects the real sector of the other country but movements in  become perfectly
correlated across countries. This also implies international co-movement in nancial 
ows.
Also in the case of nancial integration the probability of t =  can be expressed as a
function of the aggregate states, that is, p(st). Now, however, one of the two equilibria can be
induced by changes in expectations in one of the two countries. For simplicity suppose that
in states with multiple equilibria the domestic country expects t =  with probability p. The
same for the foreign country. Based on this assumption we have that p(st) 2 f0;2 p(1    p) +
21 p2;  p2;1g. The probability is zero when rms choose not to borrow up to the limit (t = 
t = 0)
even if the expectation is t = 
t = . The probability is 2 p(1    p) +  p2 if rms choose to
borrow up to the limit (t = 
t > 0) when either t or 
t are equal to . The probability is
 p2 if rms choose to borrow up to the limit (t = 
t > 0) only if both t and 
t are equal
to . Finally, the probability is 1 if rms choose to borrow up to the limit (t = 
t > 0)
independently of the values of t and 
t.
The general denition of equilibrium is analogous to the denition provided for the model
with exogenous t. We simply need to add the probability function p(st) which must be
consistent with the optimal decisions of rms as described above.
5 Model with capital accumulation
We now relax the assumption that the input of capital is xed. This introduces additional
state variables that increase the computational complexity of the model. Since the enforce-
ment constraint is only occasionally binding, we need to use global approximation techniques.
Unfortunately, these techniques are computationally intensive and become quickly impractical
when we have a large numbers of state variables. Therefore, in order to reduce the sucient
set of state variables, we will make some special assumptions about the production technology.
Investors-rms: The production function takes the form
yt = (Kt + K
t )1 k
th
t  F(Kt + K
t ;kt;ht);
where Kt is the `aggregate' capital in the domestic country and K
t in the foreign country, kt
is the `individual' input of capital and ht is the `individual' input of labor. We assume that
 +  < 1.
The dependence of the production function from the worldwide stock of capital, Kt + K
t ,
captures positive externalities. The purpose of the externalities is to have constant returns in
reproducible factors (AK technology), without loosing the competitive structure of the model,
that is, each producer runs a production technology with non-increasing returns.
Given it the 
ow of investment, the stock of capital evolves according to






22where  is the depreciation rate and the function (:) is strictly increasing and concave, cap-
turing adjustment costs in investment. The assumption of capital adjustment costs is common
in international macro models and it is made to prevent excessive volatility of investments.
The budget constraint of the rm is




and the enforcement constraint




We will now take advantage of the AK structure and normalize the model by the worldwide
stock of capital Kt + K
t . Using the tilde sign to denote normalized variables, we can rewrite
the budget constraint, law of motion for capital and enforcement constraint as













The variable gt = (Kt+1+K
t+1)=(Kt+K
t ) is the gross growth rate of worldwide capital and
~ kt = kt=(Kt +K
t ) is the normalized individual capital. We will denote by st = Kt=(Kt +K
t )
the aggregate share of capital owned by domestic rms. Since in equilibrium kt = Kt, we also
have that ~ kt = st.
As in the simpler model without capital accumulation, investors hold an internationally
diversied portfolio of shares, and rms use the common discount factor mt+1 = [(dt+1 +
d
t+1)=(dt + d
t)] . In terms of variables normalized by the worldwide capital, the discount




~ dt+1 + ~ d
t+1





23The optimization problem solved by an individual rm can be rewritten as
~ V (~ s;~ k;~ b) = max
~ d;~ h;~ i;~ b0
(
~ d + g1 E ~ m0~ V (~ s0;~ k0;~ b0)
)
(16)
subject to (13), (14);(15);
where ~ V is the rm's value normalized by aggregate worldwide capital K +K, and ~ s denotes
the normalized aggregate states as specied below.
We can now see the analytical convenience of having the capital externality. Thanks to the
AK structure, we can write the rm's value function as Vt = (Kt + K
t )  ~ Vt and rescale the
problem of the rm by worldwide capital. By doing so, we do not need to keep track of the
aggregate stock of capital as a state variable. Of course, because we are looking at a general
equilibrium, we also need to make sure that the supply of labor does not grow over time. This
will be the case with the worker's utility specied earlier.
Appendix B derives the rst order conditions for the rm's problem. After imposing the
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+
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Here t is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the enforcement constraint and Qt is
the Lagrange multiplier associated with the law of motion for the stock of capital (Tobin's q).
We can verify that capital does not enter these equations.
Notice that the property established in the simpler model for which the Lagrange multiplier
is common across domestic and foreign rms, also applies to this extended model. In fact, from
24condition (18) we can see that the common discount factor and the equalization of the interest
rates across countries imply t = 
t. Therefore, if the enforcement constraint is binding in
one country, it must also be binding in the other. The labor wedge in the demand of labor,
1=(1   t), is also equalized across countries.
Aggregate states and equilibrium: Denote by ~ Wt = ~ Btst + ~ B
t (1   st) the normalized
worldwide wealth of households/workers. Thanks to the AK technology and the normalization
described above, we only need to keep track of two `endogenous' state variables: ~ Wt and
st. Therefore, compared to the simpler model considered earlier, the introduction of capital
accumulation adds only one state variable, that is, the share of worldwide capital owned
by domestic rms, st.8 Therefore, having only two continuous states variables, it becomes
manageable to solve the model numerically using global approximation methods. Appendix C
reports the list of equilibrium conditions and describes the computational procedure.
5.1 Extension with productivity shocks
Since a large body of literature in international macroeconomics has developed from the Inter-
national Real Business Cycle, it would be informative to investigate how our model performs
with productivity shocks and compare it with credit shocks.
To this end we specify the production function as
yt = zt(Kt + K
t )1 k
th
t  F(zt;Kt + K
t ;kt;ht);
where zt denotes the stochastic level of productivity. The variable zt is country-specic and
follows a rst order Markov process.
6 Quantitative analysis
This section studies the properties of the model quantitatively after the calibration of the
parameters. The model is solved numerically using the procedure described in Appendix C.
We think of country 1 as the US and country 2 as the other countries in the group of the
seven largest industrialized economies, that is, Canada, Japan, France, Germany, Italy, UK. We
refer to this group as G6 countries. The discount factor for workers, , and the discount factor
8This additional state is necessary because of the adjustment cost in investment. In absence of adjustment
costs, we could also ignore st.
25for investors, , are set to target an average interest rate of 1.6 percent and an average return
on equity of 7 percent. In the deterministic steady state the interest rate is equal to 1=   1
and the return on equity is equal to 1=   1. In the stochastic economy the relations between
the intertemporal discount factors and the average returns are more complex. Therefore, to
choose  and  we have to follow an iterative procedure where we x these two parameters
together with all other parameters, solve the model and check whether the average returns
match the targets. The required values are  = 0:996 and  = 0:984. Therefore, there is a 1
percent dierence between the two discount factors. This is smaller than the equity premium,
5:4%=4 = 1:35%. The dierence is the risk premium.
The utility function takes the form U(c;h) = ln(c) h1+1==(1+1=) where  is the Frisch
elasticity of labor supply. We set the elasticity to 0.75 which is between the micro and macro
estimates. The parameter  is set so that working hours are 0.3 on average.
Next we parameterize the production function. The parameter  is chosen to have a steady
state labor income share of 0.7. Without uncertainty, the fraction of output going to workers
in the form of wages is equal to =.9 Given the values of  and , we choose  so that this
fraction is equal to 0.7. Of course, in the stochastic economy the average labor share is not
exactly 0.7 but the dierence is small. Next we set the return to scale for an individual rm
to  +  = 0:9. Given the value of  we derive the value of  = 0:9   .














This functional form for the capital adjustment cost is widely used in the literature (see, for
example, Jermann (1998)). The parameters 1 and 2 are chosen so that in the deterministic
steady state Q = 1 and I = K. This requires 1 =  and 2 =  =(1   ). Therefore,
we need to choose two parameters,  and . The rst is the depreciation rate which we set
to  = 0:02. The second determines the sensitivity of the adjustment cost and we set it to
 = 0:5.
At this point we are left with the parameters for the stochastic properties of the shocks.
Let's start with the productivity series. After constructing Solow residuals series for the US
9From the rst order condition of labor, equation (4), we derive wh=F(z;k;h) = (1   ), which provides
an expression for the labor share. We now use condition (5) to derive an expression for . Taking into account
that in a deterministic steady state m
0 =  and R = 1=, this condition becomes = = 1   . Substituting in
the labor share (1   ), we get the expression reported in the main text.

























The log series are linearly detrended and US
t+1 and G6
t+1 are mean zero white noises with
standard deviation US
z and G6
z respectively. The estimation returns z = 0:98,  z =  0:008,
US
z = 0:0059, G6
z = 0:0065. The correlation between residuals is 0.15.
The estimation shows that there is very low cross-country comovement between the Solow
residuals of the two countries and they have very similar standard deviations. Therefore, the
process for the productivity variables can be well approximated by symmetric and independent
rst order autoregressive processes with autocorrelation parameter  = 0:98 and standard
deviation of residuals  = 0:0062.
Let's turn now to the nancial shocks. The variable  takes only two values. In addition to
the choice of these two values we have to pin down  p, that is, the probability with which each
country form pessimistic expectations ( = ) in states with multiple equilibria. We choose ,
 and  p to match three targets: (i) the average leverage (debt over capital), which we set to
0.5); (ii) the standard deviation of debt over output; (iii) the frequencies of crisis, which we
set to about 4%.10 The full list of parameter values are reported in Table 1.
Table 1: List of parameters
Discount factor for households/workers,  0.996
Discount factor for entrepreneurs,  0.986
Utility parameter,  16.293
Production technology,  0.200
Production technology,  0.700
Depreciation rate,  0.020
Capital adjustment cost,  0.050
Productivity persistence, z 0.980
Productivity volatility, z 0.006
Low liquidation value,  0.550
High liquidation value,  0.650
Frequency of low liquidation value,  p 0.200
Appendix C describes the computational procedure which is based on the discretization
10Although the three parameters are chosen jointly, we can identify the primary parameter that aects each
of the three targets. The average leverage is mostly determined by the average . The standard deviation of
debt is mostly determined by the dierence between  and . The frequency of crisis is mostly determined by  p.
27of the state space. The exogenous states zt and z
t are each approximated with a three-state
Markov chain using Tauchen (1986). The endogenous states ~ bt and st are each discretized on a
grid with eleven points. Values outside the grids are determined through bi-linear interpolation.
6.1 Results
Our rst result follows simply by noticing that proposition 4.1 extends to this more general
environment so that with endogenous credit disturbances credit markets conditions (changes
in t and 
t ) are perfectly correlated so, since countries are perfectly symmetric, in presence of
credit shocks alone all variables (real and nancial) are perfectly correlated across countries.
Hence a large credit shock can induce very strong co-movement in real and nancial variables
like the one documented in section 2.
In presenting additional results we outline four main properties: (i) the asymmetric response
to shocks; (ii) the counter-cyclicality of labor productivity in response to credit shocks; (iii) the
severity of crisis after long periods of credit and macroeconomic booms; (iv) the importance
of credit shocks for the volatility of labor and asset prices.
Asymmetry: Figure 5 plots the impulse responses to a credit expansion and a credit con-
traction. We report only the responses for one country since they are symmetric. A credit
expansion is generated starting from the limiting equilibrium in which the economy converges
after a long series of draws t = . From this equilibrium we consider a sequence of draws
t =  starting at t = 1. Therefore, a credit expansion is generated by a permanent switch
from  to . Similarly, the impulse responses to a credit contraction are generated starting
from the limiting equilibrium in which the economy converges after a long series of draws
t = . Starting at t = 1 the economy experiences a sequence of draws t = . The draws of
productivity are assumed to be zt =  z, the mean value.
Two remarks are in order. First, the impulse responses take place in a range of states
that admit multiple equilibria. Therefore, the draws of t are possible equilibrium outcomes.
Second, agents do not know in advance the actual draws of t and zt, and therefore, they take
into account the uncertainty induced by the stochastic distribution of t and zt.
In response to the credit expansion we see a gradual increase in the stock of debt and a
persistent expansion in labor and output. The magnitude of the macroeconomic expansion,
however, is not large at impact.The macroeconomic expansion induced by the credit boom
arises through the following mechanism. At impact the rm becomes unconstrained which
28Figure 5: Impulse responses to credit expansions and contractions.
29eliminates the labor wedge. In addition to that and after the initial period, there is a second
mechanism. As rms take on more debt, they pay more dividends, increasing the discount
factor m0. Thanks to the lower discounting, rms invest more. At the same time, the higher
borrowing from rms increases equilibrium interest rate that increases equilibrium labor supply
and output. The responses to a credit contraction displays a dierent pattern. The stock of
debt declines more quickly and the responses of labor, output and investment are much larger
at impact. Therefore, the model generates a strong asymmetry in the responses to credit
expansions and contractions. The intuition for the asymmetry is best understood starting from
a situation in which the enforcement constraint is not binding; if the constraint gets relaxed
the Lagrange multiplier cannot fall below zero so the expansionary eect on unemployment
will be mild (only through the general equilibrium discussed above). If instead the constraints
get tighter the Lagrange multiplier goes from 0 to being positive and that causes, through
equation 17, equilibrium employment and output to fall. As we discussed in section 2 this
asymmetry is consistent with macroeconomic patterns observed during the period 2005-2010.
Countercyclical labor productivity: The last panel of Figure 5 plots the impulse re-
sponses of labor productivity, that is, the ratio between output and hours. As in the previous
gure we see an asymmetry between credit expansions and credit contractions. More impor-
tantly, a credit expansion inducing an increase in hiring without any change in TFP causes a
decline in labor productivity while a credit contraction, inducing a decline in hiring, generates
an increase in labor productivity. This is important for capturing one of the counter-cyclical
nature of labor productivity during the crisis in US documented in section 2.
Credit booms and severity of recessions: Figure 6 plots the impulse responses to a
credit expansion that later reverts back to the pre-expansion level. A credit boom is generated
as described above. Starting from an equilibrium to which the economy converges after a long
series of t = , we assume that at time 1 the economy experiences a switch to t =  (credit
expansion). The value of  stays at the higher value for several periods and then it reverts
back to  permanently. We consider credit booms with duration of 4 quarters (left panels) and
20 quarters (right panels).
The key nding is that the macroeconomic impact of the credit contraction increases with
the duration of the credit expansion. After a protracted credit boom, the economy accumulates
large leverages. When the credit reversal arrives, the required de-leveraging is more severe and
30Figure 6: Duration of credit expansions and severity of contractions.
31that forces rm to reduce hiring more generating a stronger macroeconomic contraction. In
this way the model captures why recessions that arise after long periods of nancial and
macroeconomic expansions tend to be more damaging for the real sector of the economy.
Volatility of labor and asset prices: Table 2 reports the standard deviations of various
variables. Three versions of the economy are considered: the economy with productivity shocks
only; the economy with credit shocks only; and the economy with both shocks. The statistics
are computed after detrending the simulated series with a band-pass lter that preserves cycles
of 1.5-8 years (Baxter and King (1999)).
Table 2: Business cycle statistics of key variables from detrended simulated series.
Productivity Credit Both
shocks only shocks only shocks
Standard deviations
Output 0.76 0.88 1.16
Consumption 0.44 0.68 0.77
Labor 0.26 1.26 1.26
Investment 0.77 2.27 2.36
Tobin's q 0.38 1.14 1.18
Stock market value 0.54 2.46 2.45
Interest rate 0.25 0.48 0.48
Return on equity 0.37 5.82 5.82
Expected returns (% annualized)
Interest rate 1.56 1.40 1.40
Return on equity 5.62 6.96 6.96
Equity risk premium 0.06 1.56 1.56
Nonbinding constraints, % 99.99 96.44 96.04
Two properties are especially noticeable. First, the model with credit shocks can generate
much higher volatility of labor, bringing the model closer to the US data for the crisis where
employment fell more than output (see gure 2). The reason is simply that credit shocks
cause, through the lagrange multiplier on the enforcement constraints, autonomous movements
in employment that, due to decreasing returns, drive smaller movements in output. Second,
credit shocks also generate a high volatility of asset prices. In particular, in the version of
the model with only credit shocks, the stock market value (equity value of rms) is almost
three times more volatile than output. This can also be seen in the bottom panel of Figure
325 which plots the impulse responses of the market value of equity to a credit expansion and
contraction. In contrast, with only productivity shocks, the value of the rm is less volatile
than output. The reason for the higher asset prices volatility is mainly that credit shocks can
sharply change the stochastic discount factor of investors (see equation 17 above) who hold
stocks and hence large 
uctuations in stock prices emerge in equilibrium. This suggests that
credit shocks can contribute to explain at least part of the large volatility of stock prices we
have observed during the crisis (see gure 4).
As a result of the higher volatility of asset prices and discount factor of investors, the model
can also generate a non-negligible equity risk-premium.11 This is about 1.56 percent yearly
and it mainly generated by credit shocks. We also observe that the volatility of equity returns
is quite high in the model but the volatility of the interest rate is small.12
7 Global nancial crisis and heterogeneous labor markets
In section 2 we pointed out that the pattern of employment during the crisis is dierent between
US and the other G6. This point is also shown using the idea of the `labor wedge', that is,
the dierence between the marginal rate of substitution in consumption and leisure and the
marginal product of labor. Formally, this is dened as Uh(ct;ht)=Uc(ct;ht) Fh(kt;ht), where
Uh and Uc are the marginal utilities of leisure and consumption respectively and Fh is the
marginal product of labor. In a standard Real Business Cycle model with CES utility and








Using this formula, Ohanian and Rao (2011) nd that while in the US the labor wedge
dropped dramatically during the recent crisis, the average wedge in other G7 counties experi-
enced a modest drop. In few countries like Germany it even increased. The goal of this section
is to show that the dierent responses of the labor market can be reconciled with the view
11We should be careful in dening the equity risk-premium. Since bond holders (workers) have a higher
discounting than equity holders (investors), the dierence between the expected return on equity (for investors)
and on bonds (for workers) is not the risk premium. In fact, even in absence of risk, the return on equity will
be higher than the return on bonds. Given the calibration of  = 0:996 and  = 0:986, the return dierential in
absence of risk would be about 4 percent yearly. Given this, we dene the equity risk-premium as the dierence
between the return dierential between equity and bonds and the dierence in discount rates between investors
and workers.
12The standard deviations for the returns are calculated on unltered data.
33of a global nancial crisis when the characteristics of the labor markets are dierent across
countries.
In order to show this point we extend our model by adding two elements: variable labor
utilization and heterogeneous labor rigidities. The role of variable labor utilization is to allow
for a more powerful mechanism for endogenous 
uctuations in measured labor productivity.
The role of labor rigidities is to allow for a dierent response of labor utilization and measured
labor input to shocks. By further assuming that labor rigidities dier across countries the
model can generate dierent responses of macroeconomic and labor market variables. This
last assumption is motivated by the widespread view that there are signicant cross countries
heterogeneity in labor markets rigidities. Ohanian and Rao (2011) refer to indicators from
the OECD Employment Outlook (2008) and report that the US is the country with the most

exible labor market. On the other hand, many of the countries in continental Europe and
Japan are placed at the opposite end in the scale of labor market 
exibility.
Let's start with labor utilization. The production function is specied as
F(Kt;kt;nt);
where nt is the `eective' input of labor resulting from the combination of (measured) hours,













The parameter % is the elasticity of substitution between hours spent in the working place
and the actual utilization of labor. When % = 1 we have nt = ht  et, which is used often in
the literature. The cost of utilization comes from workers disutility. Given the utility function
U(ct;ht+et), workers face higher disutility not only when they spent more hours in the working
place but also when their services are utilized more. An implication of this specication is that
the utilization cost is equal to the wage rate wt and the total cost of labor for the rm is
(ht + et)wt.
So far the addition of labor utilization is inconsequential for the properties of the model.
Given the CES aggregation and the fact that the wage rate is the price for both ht and ut,
rms always choose et = ht. Thus, we can simply focus on ht as in the original model and
abstract from utilization. This equivalence no longer holds once we add labor market rigidities
34on working hours ht but not on utilization ut. Some authors interpret labor market rigidities
as constraining the extensive margin (employment) rather than intensive margin (per-worker
hours). However, since the model does not distinguish the extensive from the intensive margin,
we interpret labor market rigidities as restrictions on total hours ht. More specically we
assume that rms incur the convex cost
(ht    h)2wt;
where  h is exogenous.
Ideally we would like to use a more standard adjustment cost. For example something like
(ht   ht 1)2wt. This alternative formulation, however, would introduce an additional state
variable, ht 1, which increases the computational complexity of the model. To avoid this, we
have specied the cost as deviation from a xed target. The multiplication by the wage rate
is motivated by economic and technical considerations. From an economic point of view it is
likely that the direct cost of labor, which depends on the wage, also aects the cost of changing
employment. An example is severance payments. From a technical point of view the presence
of the wage allows us to apply the same normalization procedure used in the version of the
model with capital accumulation.
The key parameter is . With a positive value of , the response of utilization et to shocks
is bigger than the response of total hours ht. This generates a decline in measured TFP and,
potentially, to a decline in measured labor productivity yt=ht. These eects increase with the
value of  (labor market rigidity). Therefore, if in our model the rst country (the US) is
characterized by lower labor market rigidities than the second country (the other G7), the
model could generate very dierent responses of the labor markets to a nancial shock. This
will also be re
ected in the responses of the labor wedge.
7.1 Simulation results
We describe here only the calibration of the parameters that need to be re-calibrated or were
not present in the baseline model.
We start with the elasticity of substitution between hours and utilization, the parameter
%, which we set to 5. This value implies a high degree of substitutability between hours and
utilization. To show the importance of this parameter we also report the results for lower values.
The utility parameter  is chosen to have average working hours of 0.33 in the equilibrium
35without labor rigidities.
At this point we are left with the parameters  h, 1 for country 1 and 2 for country 2.
Given the values of 1 and 2, we could choose  h to have the desired dierential in average
employment between the two countries. We choose total hours in the US to be 5 percent higher
than in other G7 countries. However, this is not important for the quantitative properties of
the model. The important parameters are 1 and 2. Unfortunately we are not aware of
statistics that can be used directly to pin down these two parameters. Because of this we take
a more pragmatic approach. We pick the values of 1 = 0:3 and 2 = 1:5 so that the model
generates heterogeneous drops of labor wedges in response to a negative nancial shock similar
to the drops observed during the recent crisis. Of course, the relevance of the exercise is only
to show that the model `could' in principle generate the heterogeneous responses of the labor
market observed in the US and the G6 countries. Nevertheless we think that the exercise is
helpful in clarifying that the idea of a global nancial crisis as a driver of the recent recession
cannot be written down by the observation of cross country heterogeneity in labor market
dynamics.
Figure 7 plots the impulse responses of several variables to a permanent credit contraction.
The impulse responses are constructed using the same methodology as in Figure 5. As can
be seen from the gure, the responses of investment and output are very similar between the
two countries. However, the responses of hours and the labor wedge are signicantly smaller
in country 2.13 We also observe strong heterogeneity in the response of labor productivity
which falls only slightly in country 1 but experiences a large drop in country 2. Therefore, the
model could replicate the dierent dynamics of the labor market between the US and other
G6 countries even if the dynamics of other macroeconomic variables are very dierent.
Before closing, we would like to make some remarks about the concept of labor rigidities.
These are typically interpreted as the consequence of institutional factors such as regulations
and union power. Here, instead, we would like to give a broader interpretation. For example,
it is well known that labor market rigidities are dierent across sectors. To the extent that
in certain countries the crisis has impacted sectors with greater labor market 
exibility, we
13In our model, the labor wedge is slightly dierent from equation (21) because the production function is
not constant returns. Furthermore, there is labor utilization and ct is only the consumption of workers, not
aggregate consumption. However, we measure the labor wedge as if the true model was the standard RBC since
this is the way it has been measured in the literature. After simulating our model and generating the series for
ct, ht and yt, we compute the wedge by plugging the series in equation (21). The values of the parameters are
the same values used in Ohanian and Rao (2011), that is,  = 0:99,  = 0:36,  = 0:0175, g = 0:005 and  is
chosen so to have steady hours of 0.33.
36Figure 7: Impulse responses to a credit contraction with asymmetric labor markets.
37may observe larger declines in employment and hours. For example, it is well know that
construction tends to have more 
exible hiring as a result of its high cyclicality. Then, countries
that experience large contractions in the real estate sector are also likely to experience large
drops in employment. This is the case, for example, for Spain, a country where the real estate
sector experienced an abnormal boom before the crisis. Because of the previous boom it was
not surprising that this sector was hit hard by the crisis. Since during the boom this sector was
hiring a signicant fraction of temporary workers, many of which immigrants, it was relatively
easy for this sector to downsize employment. In this sense, a country like Spain could be
considered a country with a 
exible labor market, simply because the sectors with greater
labor market 
exibility are relatively more important. On the other hand, it is well known
that Germany is one of the few countries that did not experience a real estate boom before the
crisis and, because of this, the sector was not hit as hard as in other countries. Instead, the
German economy was adversely aected in industries like automotive. But this is one of the
industries where labor rigidities are especially high. So it is not surprising that Germany cut
production without ring. In some cases this was encouraged by government support policies.
8 Conclusion
The recent nancial crisis has been characterized by an historically high degree of international
synchronization in real and nancial variables. We have proposed a theoretical framework in
which endogenous 
uctuations in credit market conditions result from self-fullling expecta-
tions. These 
uctuations aect the real sector of the economy through a credit channel: booms
enhance the borrowing capacity of rms and in the general equilibrium they lead to higher
employment and production. The opposite arises after a credit contraction. Interestingly, busi-
ness cycle 
uctuations induced by movements in credit markets are highly asymmetric, i.e.,
contractions are sharper than expansions and they generate large 
uctuations in asset prices.
When countries are nancially integrated, movements in credit markets also generate large
spillovers to the real and nancial sectors of other countries. There are two channels of inter-
national transmission. The rst is through the cost of capital which in an integrated nancial
market is equalized across countries. The second channel is based on the endogenous na-
ture of credit market conditions. These conditions change when the economy switches from
one self-fullling equilibrium to another self-fullling equilibrium. But in an integrated world
market the shift in one country can only arise if the shift takes place also in the other. There-
38fore, changing nancial market conditions are highly synchronized when nancial markets are
internationally integrated.
This study does not exclude the possibility that other sources of business cycle 
uctu-
ations also generate international co-movement in real variables. Our interest in changing
credit market conditions as a source of business cycle is motivated by their ability to generate
large cross-country co-movements in the real sector of the economy together with the large
international co-movements in the 
ows of nancing and asset prices.
39Appendix
A First order conditions
Consider the optimization problem (1) and let  and  be the Lagrange multipliers associate with the
two constraints. Taking derivatives we get:
d : 1    = 0
h : [Fh(h)   w]   Fh(h) = 0







The envelope condition is:
Vb(s;b) =  
The above conditions can be re-arranged as in (4) and (5).
B First order conditions for the model with capital















Qt = tt + g
 
t E ~ mt+1 ~ Vk(~ st+1;~ kt+1;~ bt+1) (25)
where t is the lagrange multiplier associated with the enforcement constraint and Qt is the lagrange
multiplier associated with the law of motion of capital (Tobin's q). The multiplier associated with the
budget constraint is 1. For the foreign country we have the same conditions but with country specic
variables denoted with the start superscript.
40The envelope conditions are:
~ Vb(~ st;~ kt;~ bt) =  1 (26)
~ Vk = (1   t)Fk(zt;~ kt;ht) +












Substituting the envelope conditions and imposing the equilibrium conditions kt = Kt and ~ kt = st,
we obtain (17)-(20).
C Dynamic system and solution approach
We will use the bar sign to denote aggregate worldwide variables normalized by the worldwide stock of






 ~ dt + ~ d
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t = ~ ct (29)







































































































































































42Equations (28)-(43) form a dynamic system composed of 16 equations. Given the states zt;t;z
t ;
t ; bt;st,





t, gt, t, Rt,  dt,  bt+1, st+1. Therefore, we
have a dynamic system of 16 equations in 16 unknowns.
The computational procedure is based on the approximation of four functions:
 1(st+1) =  c
 1
t+1
 2(st+1) =  d
 
t+1








































In addition to these four function, we need to guess the function p(st+1), that is, the probability of
t+1 = . This is necessary to compute the next period expectation.
The procedure starts with a guess for the values of the approximated functions  1(st+1),  2(st+1),
 3(st+1),  4(st+1). We rst form a two dimensional grid for the endogenous states  b and s. Then for
each realization of the exogenous shocks|zt;t;z
t ;
t |we guess the values taken by the above functions
over the grid points. Values outside the grid are obtained through bi-linear interpolation. Next we guess
p(st+1) for each grid point. Once we know the approximated functions and probabilities for t+1, we
can solve for the 16 unknowns of the system (28)-(43) at each grid point and for each possible values of
zt;t;z
t ;
t . In nding the solutions we check whether the enforcement constraint is binding (t > 0)
or not binding (t = 0). We then use the solutions found at each grip point to update the guesses for
the four functions  1(st+1),  2(st+1),  3(st+1),  4(st+1) and the probabilities p(st+1). To update these
probabilities we need to check whether multiple equilibria are feasible at any possible states. Eectively
we check this on the grid points of the states. We keep iterating until the guesses for  1(st+1),  2(st+1),
 3(st+1),  4(st+1) and p(st+1) at each grid point for the states are equal to the values obtained by
solving the dynamic system.
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